China’s Hard-line Approach and Ethnic Unrest in Xinjiang: A Theoretical Understanding

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Abstract: Ethnic conflicts issue has perturbed China for quite a long period, hence China is not a one-Unified nation, PRC is very clear that Xinjiang was and is part of China just like its other disputed territorial claims and it does not recognize the Uyghurs as the indigenous people of Xinjiang calling them settlers. In this paper, I have studied the PRC’s official history of Xinjiang and the historians’ history who are specialized in Xinjiang and the Silk Road history to understand the two different narratives that are fundamentally different and incompatible from each other. The framework used is the typology of qualitative studies as this is helpful to assess the situation theoretically and categorize accordingly. Beijing is very harsh towards the Uyghurs and has detained over one-million of the Uyghurs for 're-education' to show its legitimacy and they are considered a threat to the state’s existence, post 9/11 China has been using this global Islamophobia wave justifying that all steps taken by the state are to combat radicalization. This paper is not about the Uyghurs trace being found connected to external non-state actors, whereas the study takes a dig in securitization discourse discussing that, the Uyghurs does not have a structured way of attacks like terrorists, its more of showing dissatisfaction against the authorities because neither they have the autonomy nor have any rights to exercise. The Chinese policies are countering them back in terms of attacks because the Uyghurs are relatively deprived and they are in a constant source of competition with the Han Chinese.

Keywords: Ethnic Conflict, Xinjiang, Uyghurs, Securitization, Han Chinese.

1. Introduction

This study is about finding out the causes of the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang and when does the conflict turn violent or whether ethnic divisions inevitably generate violence and why China is using securitization theory discourse as a shield against the atrocities done on the Uyghurs and other Turkic ethnic groups. My study is built on three main elements, first studying the discourse of securitization and applying the ethnic theoretical model to put forth my arguments; second, applying the model on ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and third, finding the conditions why the conflict becomes violent. The focus will also be on studying the history of Xinjiang and why PRC adopted ways of creating its own
Chinese history and why Xinjiang region is so important to Beijing that it will stand firm on the methods it has adopted to eradicate a particular ethnic group despite all the international pressure and will not succumb to it.

Intra-state conflicts have increased more than inter-state struggle and the number of ethnic has increased considerably with the end of the Cold War and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The rise of ethnic nationalism and the outbreak of ethnic conflicts have complicated the matter, the scholarly community has done extensive theoretical work to understand the causes of ethnic conflict but the limitation is that we do not have a cohesive framework. Conflicts can happen because of distinctive nationalist doctrines, perceived grievances, patterns of political, economic and cultural discrimination, historical grievances. Xinjiang region geographically is placed at a strategic location and it has the potential of a re-escalation of conflicts in the future hence, much scholarly attention should also be given to this particular restive region.

Ethnic unrest has been a part of international society through history and it is a highly contested phenomenon and still is a part of 21st C, generally, the scholarly debated on ethnic conflict is categorized into three major theories of ethnic conflict i.e. Primordialism, Instrumentalism, and Constructivism (Williams, 2015).

2. Main objective of the study

The study considers analyzing to what extent the PRC is perturbed by the ethnic unrest, why ethnic conflict is seen as a hindrance to the China Dream (Zhonghua Meng) concept. This directly links to understand why the Chinese authoritarian state has adopted such harsh steps to combat the ethnic unrest; whether painting the picture of ethnic unrest in Xinjiang is because of Islamic radicalization of the Uyghurs and the PRC is protecting its sovereignty (which it claims) is justified. Nevertheless, despite being a developed state having a second-largest economy in the world fails to acknowledge that this unrest by the Uyghurs could be for cultural autonomy and other inequalities (social, political, economic) that it is facing against the Han community. What advantage will PRC have by discursively constructing the narrative that the Uyghurs are terrorists, I will evaluate the above-mentioned objective to understand the main agenda of Beijing and the Uyghurs, in this way I will be able to explain the mechanism through how the conflict became violent and how the character has changed in time.

3. The Central Questions of the study

My main research questions of the study are what are the reasons that triggered the Uyghur ethnic group to resist the PRC authorities and become violent? Are the PRC official’s strategy of economic development (Great Western Development) directly proportional to trigger the ethnic conflict? Are the harsh policies by the Chinese state against the idea of self-determination or against the idea of autonomy and granting rights? The importance of the study is to contribute to the work already been done by scholars that ethnic conflict in Xinjiang can also be because of reasons such as group motivation, failure of the social contract and green war i.e. environmental degradation.

4. Methodology

As mentioned above the aim is to study the ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and to serve this purpose I have used the methodology proposed by Colin Elman’s explanatory typologies of qualitative study as it will allow you to classify the theories and serve as a foundation for explanation, generalization and
policy recommendations. Explanatory typology has an advantage that allows you to state pre-existing theories, it is a compliment to deductive approaches, and we can also test theories and provides a classificatory function because when applied to case studies we can classify which category it belongs (ethnic theoretical model.) To refine typologies two techniques can be employed, compression technique one can use multivariable explanatory typology and with expansion technique, missed combinations and assumptions can be discovered (Elman, 2005).

I will study the pre-existing theories of ethnic conflict to analyze the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang and the research will be based on the deductive approach.

The concept of Chinese nation itself is quite ambiguous because linguistically the word *Minzu* stands for both nationality (an ethnic group) and a nation and to fade this confusion famous Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong attempted to remedy the situation by suggesting that the Chinese nation is “Unified but Pluralistic” (Yiti duoyuan) (Kallio, 2019). According to the 2010 census, the largest ethnic group is the Han Chinese accounts for 91.59%, the other 55 ethnic minority groups make up the remaining 8.41% inhabiting in the PRC’s periphery. The other ethnic minorities except for the Hans are never termed as indigenous people, the PRC maintains a firm stand that they are settlers who have settled down at the Central Asian plains. These Uyghurs settlers face issues of identity and assimilation with the Han Chinese faces challenges in maintaining religious beliefs and practices and challenges even within the same ethnic group.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has 5,500 Km of international borders and occupies sixth of China’s landmass its geostrategic position is such that in the past it was a crucial passageway for the Silk Road and a stake in the ‘Great Game’ between the British, Russian and the Chinese empires. Xinjiang holds a pivotal position at the crossroads of six cultural and geographic region: Central Asia (bordering newly independent republics of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan), Russia, Mongolia, the Indian Sub-continent (sharing common borders with India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), Tibet and China itself. The Uyghurs are Turkic-speaking Muslims from Central Asia and they are one of numbers of persecuted Muslims minorities in Xinjiang including the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Hui. Amidst regional tensions as China has territorial disputes with neighboring countries China also sees this region as the potential supplier for its ever-growing energy needs (Becquelin, 2007) because of large oil deposits found in the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang.

5. Identifying the Ethnic Groups and Patterns of Distribution

China modified Stalin’s approach of 1913 to identify the ethnic group (minzu) was four to six (Shen & Ou, 2007) but then the White Paper released by the government in 1999 mentions that in China ethnic groups inhabit three major patterns: first, living together over vast areas. Second, living in individual concentrated communities in small areas; and third, minorities living in concentrated communities within the Han majority community or vice-versa. Such a pattern of distribution is the result of group migration and interactions during China’s long historical development (White Paper, PRC, 1999). The last official census (2010) gives an idea that the population is concentrated in two segments i.e. on the corridor of the northern foothills of the Tengri Tagh (Tian Shan) and the arcs of oases to the south of Tengri Tagh. The Uyghurs are located in the south and Kazaks in the north (Kozhirova, Khazhmuratova, & Marmontova, 2016) and the Hans migration to the Xinjiang area is viewed from a vantage point framed as a
state’s strategy of assimilation (Agnieszka, 2013).

6. The resilience of the CCP

Andrew Nathan argued in his articles that the CCP officials believe they can deal with all the problems it is quite resilient for any situation, its strength is that it evolves and adapts with time. The protracted ethnic unrest is a crucial phenomenon for the Chinese state that can challenge its authoritarian resilience in the end, to counter that the Chinese leaders have adopted the nationalist discourse against the ethnic conflict. Beijing has discursively constructed the narrative that ethnic unrest in Xinjiang is an existential security threat to the Chinese state and does not see the uprisings against the local authorities. Framed the Uyghurs as terrorists and a threat to Chinese authority hence, the unfolding of facts needs to be done theoretically to understand the Chinese state logic and challenge the narrative.

7. The Re-created Chinese History and Historians History of Xinjiang

To understand the reason why China is so firm and claims the Xinjiang region is part of PRC since time immemorial we need to study history, therefore, I will first study the Chinese version of history and then focus on history, which the historians have written. The PRC claims its rights on Xinjiang based on history, controlling historiography and writing history has been the strategy of PRC leaders so that it can educate the Chinese masses and make them believe. According to Gardner Bovingdon, a researcher on Xinjiang just as the Soviet Union was formed from heterogeneous territories of the Russia Czarist empire, PRC also inherited most of the lands conquered by the Manchu Qing Empire before it collapsed in 1911 (Bovingdon, 2010). China claims that it has completed the task of building the Chinese nation but the truth is they are still working on this strenuously in China’s far northwest and have not succeeded. Resistance to the idea of nation is visible in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Uyghur population even refuse to call the territory Xinjiang they identify and prefer to call it East Turkestan the Turkic speaking region of former Soviet Central Asia now divided among Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (Dillon, 2016). China’s claim on Xinjiang extends back to the third century BC when evidence of Han Chinese trade was found in the Tarim Basin the present-day Xinjiang.

PRC claims Xinjiang since ancient times and confirms that it was under the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) emperor Qianlong when Xinjiang became part of China completely. The Qing dynasty history writing was launched in 2003 because the borders of modern China are delineated based on borders of the Qing dynasty highlighting these borders were naturally and peacefully part of China and not conquered (Kallio, 2019). It was after the end of the Chinese civil war and formation of PRC in 1949 that the name of East Turkestan was changed to Xinjiang (new frontier) in 1955 after it was designated a Uyghur autonomous status. Ethnogenesis of the Uyghur identity is that it was coterminous with the growth of antagonism towards the Chinese government meaning that their identity was easily rendered through their relationship with the Chinese state (Gladney, 2004).

Many scholars among one of them Prasenjit Duara argue nationalist history offers service to the idea of a unitary national identity with special reference to peripheral regions. States that seek to gain control over a disputed region has every incentive to produce a history of that region that naturalizes the incorporation (Duara, 1995). Scholar Bovingdon’s article ‘The History of the History of Xinjiang’ also provides valuable information regarding the historical debates about the history of, the relationship of the region and people to China. He analyzed the debates that
were conducted on newspapers, journals, and books and he pointed all the nuances of how those debates were polemically used for nationalist purposes. He observed that what was and what could be said about the history of the territory and the people living there changes systematically between the mid-Qing and in the 1980s (Bovingdon, 2001). Present Xinjiang historically a famous trade route connectivity known as the Silk Road or Sogdian network, which linked the Chinese, Mongolian, Korean, Indian, Iranian and Turkic Speaking people. Historian James Millward observes Sogdian were Iranian-speaking people and dominated trade along the Silk Road from the present-day Istanbul to Korea. Learning Xinjiang history realizes that how brutal and tenuous it is China’s claim over Xinjiang (Millward, 2013).

Until the 18th century, Xinjiang was divided by the patchwork of tiny oasis rulers, empires, warlords, pastures of northern Xinjiang allowed nomads originating from Mongolia including the Uyghurs to dominate the southern Xinjiang (Tarim Basin) and areas to the west, which include today's Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The Xinjiang now a Chinese province was referred to as Central Asian Plains was as per China it was under its rule from the Han dynasty in AD.50 but historians have observed Chinese returned under the Tang dynasty but withdrew when the dynasty collapsed. Under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Xinjiang was independent (China does not acknowledge this fact) it was only the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) that turned its attention towards Xinjiang because of its strategic location and resources (Fuller & Starr, 2003). After 1949, the dissenting voices were silenced and the new histories substituted the inconvenient historical realities in which the Uyghurs had been the members of the great Chinese family (Zhonghua Minzu). Paul Cohen term the turning of history as ‘efficacious working myth’ and proposed a question of how Xinjiang if not separated from China, could demonstrate that it was inseparable (Cohen, 1997).

The whole idea to study two different versions of history was to highlight the state strategy of how the PRC educates its masses with Chinese nationalism and easily hides the truth. Bovingdon raised concerns on government officials and scholars who have teleological thoughts asking if nationalism existed objectively how nationalities and if identity can be malleable how do you built a stable identity (Bovingdon, 2010). There were doubts also raised about Uyghur cohesive identity, and why it did not mount a nationalist uprising against the Republican or Communist regime? Historian Andrew Forbes argued that raising questions on the Uyghur and the very expectation of concerted Uyghur action betrayed a fundamental misprision regarding the history of the region and people. Xinjiang was not a single territory with the common identity it was separated into three distinct regions before the Qing conquest so distinct identities persisted and it is CCP, which has contributed to the formation of cohesive Uyghur identity.

8. Using Securitization is Justified?

The purpose to study the Chinese narrative of securitization is to analyze how much it is justified to use this discourse to carry out the hidden agenda of Sinification and eradicate the existence of Turkic minority communities a step towards resilience so that it does not perturb the state. My aim is to put comprehensively that this narrative is used to hide its own mistakes and the failure of the Chinese state to provide societal security and a balanced distribution of resources. Many international organizations have condemned China’s detainment of over one-million of the Uyghurs (and other Turkic minorities) in the so-called “re-education” camps to rectify the detainees’ mindset, educate them, and make them more loyal to the CCP because Beijing
considers them as an existential security threat. The existence of ‘re-education’ came into the news in 2017 and from then onwards the Uyghur diaspora community and the ones who managed to flee from the camps have narrated the horrific torture and human rights abuses they go through. There were uprisings by the ethnic minorities in China but it was in the 1990s, we heard many instances, and post 9/11 attack and the US ‘War on Terror’ gave China an opportunity to tell the world that the Chinese state is also the victim of Islamic radicalization. Playing the card of Chinese nationalism that it is trying to save its sovereignty it used securitization as a tool to strike hard against the minority community to avoid international pressure. Beijing with its diplomatic efforts was successful in making the US ban and label East Turkistan Islamic Movement, World Uyghur Congress along with other umbrella organizations as terrorist organizations.

Copenhagen school is closely associated with Securitization discourse Barry Buzan and his colleagues categorized five different sectors apart from the traditional military concept that conceptualizes security, not as an objective condition but see it as a process marked by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat (Buzan, De & Waever). In securitization theory, the social construction of the security issues (of who, what is being secured and from what) all depends on ‘securitizing speech acts through which threats become represented and recognized, issues become securitized and speech acts which not necessarily describes the existing security situation but it becomes successful by bringing in security situation as such (Baele, & Catarina).

Scott D. Watson argues the two elements- securitization and framing are the two compatible frameworks of analysis, though securitization is drawn from well-articulated Weaver’s 1995 article “Securitization and De-securitization” framing is a large and fragmented field of study and theoretically imprecise (Watson, 2011). Given the religious rhetoric used by ETIM and its successor party TIP and the presence of some Uyghurs in war zones from Afghanistan to Syria has risen speculation that this Chinese contribution to the global Jihadist threat. Analyzing the ethnic uprisings in Xinjiang is not easy many nuances should be considered before framing them because of their limited presence and the minorities targeting its own country gives an indication that this issue is onward looking separatism taken the path for self-determination. Much of the literature on terrorism we see now is mostly about China’s repressive nature of counter-terrorism polices and violence in Xinjiang is a hybrid assessment of the Uyghur terrorism. It is too nationalist to categorize this as the fourth wave of terrorism, not millenarian or web-savvy enough to be the fifth wave not organized enough to be an instrumentalist (Mumford, 2018).

The scholarly community is divided on Xinjiang’s securitization (Cui & Li, 2011) and scholars such as William Vaughan observed that if a referent object holds the potential historical connotation of threat (Xinjiang) then an issue could be securitized. Whereas there are scholars, who refute China’s claim of Great Western Development as de-securitization and believe it was consistent with securitization (Tredaniel & Lee, 2017). Before 9/11, the nationalist Uyghurs were a latent security threat, after 9/11, traces of connection with Islamic radical groups is regarded as an imminent threat and post 9/11 allowed China to join the cause of the war on terror and framed the dissatisfied Uyghurs as terrorists (Tredaniel & Lee, 2017).

Beijing has securitized the Xinjiang region citing that Chinese state sovereignty (referent object) is under threat but the authorities both the central and prefecture levels have failed to provide societal security. Acculturation has worsened the situation because the Turkic minorities especially the
Uyghurs are huge in number compared to other minorities and since they have their own identity, culture, land, and language, they resist this strongly. Societal security is all about large, self-sustaining identity groups, but the common issues to view as threats to societal security are

- Migration- y community of people are being diluted by influxes of Z community of people, y community people cannot be the same as what it used to be and its community population composition is being changed (Russian migration into Estonia, Han Chinese migration into Xinjiang and Tibet

- Horizontal Competition- though y community people still living there it changes their ways because of overriding cultural and linguistic influence from the z community (Quebecois fears of Anglophone Canada, Canadian fears of Americanization, Uyghurs fear of Sinicization) (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998)

The Uyghurs condition deteriorated, the ultra-conservative Islamic values known as Wahabism was never a dominant principle among the Uyghurs they practiced a moderate principle i.e. Sunni Islam (following the madhab of Imam Abu Hanifah). The continuous systematic program of Sinicization by the CCP gave a push to the Uyghur community to practice Islam diligently, which is understood as fundamentalist (Yitzak, 2005).

During the 2008 Beijing Olympic, YouTube videos circulated which indicated that ETIM had undergone a transformation, branded itself as TIP and took claim for domestic terrorism. The dearth of evidence exists regarding their operational capabilities rendering their claims of responsibility for acts of violence (Roberts, 2012). Martha Crenshaw has argued that recourse to terrorism is a logical strategic choice willingly adopted by groups to fulfill their political agenda; she proposed terrorism has thus collective rationality (Crenshaw, 1998) but such a strategic approach requires the de facto presence of an organization that is capable of fostering rational intragroup discussion. In the case of the Uyghurs, no coherent structures exist except some flimsy appearance of ETIM to execute the plan, so violence in Xinjiang is difficult to be seen as terrorist acts and the product of rational strategic choice where there is no organizational structure to execute strategy.

The case of the Uyghurs, when compared to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) because of the religious beliefs of the perpetrators, have been seized by the counter-terrorist policies of the state to manipulate global opinion. The assessment of political violence by the Uyghurs oscillates between religious and secular motives if old groups like LTTE and ETA were secular and Al-Qaeda and ISIS are religious groups then the Uyghur group ETIM/TIP falls in both stools. (Mumford, 2018)

9. Digging Theories to understand Ethnic Unrest

Using typology while studying a case to understand theoretically helps you to categorize and test your assumption and theory; I argue that using theories of ethnic conflict gives a better understanding of the situation and the reasons for intensification of ethnic conflict in Xinjiang. Post-Cold War though there was no major war the world was still not in peace as the world witnessed civil war or ethnic conflicts, several approaches have been used to explain the persistence of ethnic conflict in a modernizing world. The primordial approach considers deep social, historical and genetic foundations to explain the intensity and persistence of ethnic political action. The instrumentalist approach
highlights the importance of group material and political interests and the constructivist approach emphasizes the ways in which group identities emerge and change over time (Harff & Gurr, 2004). However, recent literature has moved beyond these three paradigms.

Beijing underwent economic reforms and applied economic development policies in Xinjiang but no such political reform happened hence, this situation of liberal economic policies with an illiberal rule in Xinjiang gives an idea of civil order in that region (Cao, Duan, Liu, Piazza, & Wei, 2018). The quest for social status can be traced to earliest writings to humanity, Hobbes asserted that men are continually in competition for honor and dignity, conceptualized by Runciman features of status determine Relative Deprivation (RD) referring to the discontent people feel that when they compare their positions to others and realize that others possess something that they don’t have. In China, the status disparity is an issue, its strategy of ‘let some people get rich’ has resulted in uneven growth during the last three decades and the mounting concern is that this growing inequality hinders the sharing of the fruits of economic development. Chinese are concerned for social status as this is reflected in the traditional saying, ‘it is better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of a Phoenix’ (Xi, 2016).

PRC’s demographic policy of Han migration is a challenge to the demographic dividend in Xinjiang; it has increased tremendous pressure in the region. The unrests are the results to show dissatisfaction and to fight for their rights because the Xinjiang region (i) has the existence of a separate ethnic community with a territorial base, (ii) has a symbolic conception of the group as a nation, and (iii) it is in actual or perceived disadvantages in comparison with the majority. The logical understanding is when people of two different ethnic communities compete directly for the same scarce resources then their ethnic identities become more important to them and group boundaries become sharply defined. The ethnopolitical conflict is likely to have genocidal consequences, (i) when elites have a history of relying on repression to maintain power (Tiananmen incident), (ii) when the country is ruled by an autocratic person (Xi Jinping’s rule). (iii) When elites use their power to reward groups differently for their loyalty (this is what PRC doing to the Han community providing all the favors) and (iv) exclusionary ideologies arise that define target groups as expandable (the Uyghurs) (Harff & Gurr, 2004). International organizations have called the atrocities on the Uyghurs as a genocide.

Relative Deprivation defined by Gurr is an existence of discrepancy between the value expectation of individual and the capabilities to fulfill those expectations unbalanced of these leads to conflict escalations; I will apply two patterns of deprivation to understand the ethnic unrests in Xinjiang.

(i) Decremental Deprivation occurs when the expectations remain the same in a group but the capabilities decline and the group loses access to scarce resources. This can explain the relation between inequalities and conflicts, the way the Xinjiang region has been turned into a surveillance state deprived of everything and no freedom to practice their own culture is making the Uyghurs unsatisfied. They are deprived of all the opportunities the demography dividend is worse, intense competition exists between the Han and the Turkic minorities. Attack on the Uyghur language and deprived of education and employment as no Uyghurs are recruited in the XUAR all official posts are occupied by the Han Chinese adds on to the deprivation and frustration the Uyghurs are facing. This horizontal inequality intensifies the situation and we see the Uyghurs venting out the frustration by doing attacks to show their dissatisfaction against the authorities (Dzuverovic, 2013). Conflicts explain the
grievance felt by the Uyghurs, the socioeconomic inter-ethnic inequality is so much prevalent becomes a source of political violence. According to Schuster, the infant mortality rate for Han Chinese is 13 per 1000 but 102 per 1000 for the Uyghurs, Xinjiang region has the worst urban-rural gap, the same gap we see in resource distribution. The PRC was against the idea of Self-determination but the prevalence of inequality in the Xinjiang region gives us the picture that it is also against granting any rights contradicting its own Constitution.

(ii) Aspirational Deprivation is a theoretical framework that explains that when countries go for economic reforms for economic growth but same time increases inequalities and deprives certain groups of the country of all the benefits. The way natural resource exploitation of Xinjiang is done just because it is the potential energy supplier to Beijing and the prevalence of XPCC has added to the inequalities. Targeting a particular ethnic group in a structured way to weaken them and suppress them doesn’t provide solutions. Suppression like this results in retaliation the simple logic the PRC authorities should understand. The coefficient of economic inequality and unemployment shows that income growth without distributional equality is the cause of the wider spread grievances that leads to terrorism. Analyzing Xinjiang theoretically gives you an opportunity to contribute to answering the theoretical question and counter China’s argument that its GWD strategy was to bring parity economic development in Xinjiang that whether a higher income level and economic development is a cure for terrorism. This deepens the scholastic debate between the grievance theory (political and economic) and the opportunity to explain the onset of civil conflicts. Historian MacCulloch did research answering the question that whether inequality leads to the outbreak of the revolution and he concluded that positive stand was towards the desirability of revolution and the rational thinking behind this was the underprivileged situation of a group and they perceive revolution as the only possible way to acquire rights (MacCulloch, 2005). History has ample evidence of this so instead of securitizing Xinjiang and labeling the Uyghurs as terrorists so that the state can strike hard and present its story that why China is taking harsh steps. Whereas, to understand why the Uyghurs are resisting and attacking is because of the inequity and unequal policies in all spheres and the failure of the state to provide the assurance to exercise its rights.

10. Conclusion

Using power by the state to curb the disturbing forces because that is a threat to sovereignty but every time this tool does not work, securitizing an issue is an extreme version of politicization the issue is framed either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. The problem pertaining to conflict resolution is the process of power sharing or at least a constitutional order but China practices a non-liberal political system and values and the power-sharing approach seems improbable for China. The Uyghurs have realized that the Chinese authorities will not offer any federal system so the Uyghurs want the world to listen and support their quest for ethnic separation.

The whole idea of my study was to counter the narrative of the Chinese state that its policies are defective and the harsh crackdown gives a clear idea that the CCP will go to any extent to stay in power. Xinjiang needs inter-ethnic peace, the conflict will harden the ethnic identities and the relations, the longer the international community remains silent the abuse of the more human rights will happen, let’s not make the world ‘Human Rights Abuse a New Normal’. No explanation should justify the construction of detention camps and the horrific torture the
Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities are suffering from, the international community should not allow China to set such an example, which later other authoritarian states might use to deal with the conflict situation in their own countries. The sooner the countries react against such atrocities the better for the world and studying theoretically the situation gives you an idea that systemic failures are the biggest reason for attacks and unrests unless there exists a mutual understanding between the Han and the floating Uyghurs about their cultures peace and stability cannot be maintained in the Xinjiang region.

Even the recent contemporary ethnic conflict literature beyond the fourth wave scholars have emphasized that emotional drivers such as fear, hatred, rage, and grievance are immediate drivers of violent action, factors such as political institutions, inequality, domination, and exclusion are deeper drivers of conflict. Hence, the Uyghurs are seeking redress.

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